UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-5-2011

Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell
Augementation Record Dckt. 37242

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell Augementation Record Dckt. 37242" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
2980.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2980

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO AUGMENT

Plaintifff-Counterdefendant-Respondent,
v,
CITY OF CALDWELL,

Supreme Court Docket No. 37242-2009
Canyon County District Court No.
2008-556

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the briefing schedule in the above entitled appeal shall be
SUSPENDED until such time as the transcript listed above has been prepared and lodged with this
Court, at which time t $ :date for the filing of RESPONDENT' S BRIEF shall be reset.
DATED this

-

day of January 2011.
By Order of thll'Supreme Court

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant.

Ref. No. 10-600

A MOTION TO AUGMENT with attachments was filed by counsel for Respondent on
December 10, 20 10, requesting this Court for an order augmenting the appellate record with the
documents attached to this Motion. Thereafter, a RESPONSE TO MOTION TO AUGMENT was filed
by counsel for Appellant on December 22, 2010, requesting this Court to deny Respondent' s Motion to
Augment and allow this appeal to proceed based on the existing record.

Therefore, good cause

cc:

~

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter Laura L. Whiting

appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant' s MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is,
GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed below with this
Court WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER and the District Court
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall be
filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30. J:
I. Transcript of the Hearing on Pioneer Irrigation District' s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Join Indispensable Parties held on April 29, 2009, a copy of which was attached to this
Motion \0 Augment. (Court Reporter Laura L. Whiting)

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record in this appeal shall include the
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion to Augment:
I. Pioneer Irrigation District' s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, ti le
stamped January 28, 2009;
2. Brief in Support of Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join
Indispensable Parties, file stamped February 18, 2009;
3. City of Caldwell's Response to Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Join Indispensable Parties, tile stamped February 25, 2009;
4. Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, file
stamped March 2, 2009;
5. Amended Second Affidavit of Matthew J. McGee, file stamped April 29, 2009; and
6. Order Regarding Pioneer Irrigation District' s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join, tile
stamped May 22, 2009.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Plaintifff-Counterdefendant-Respondent,
v,
CITY OF CALDWELL,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant.
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ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO AUGMENT
Supreme Court Docket No. 37242-2009
Canyon County District Court No.
2008-556
Ref. No.1 0-600

A MOTION TO AUGMENT with attachments was filed by counsel for Respondent on
December 10, 2010, requesting this Court for an order augmenting the appellate record with the
documents attached to this Motion. Thereafter, a RESPONSE TO MOTION TO AUGMENT was filed
by counsel for Appellant on December 22,2010, requesting this Court to deny Respondent's Motion to
Augment and allow this appeal to proceed based on the existing record.

Therefore, good cause

appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is,
GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed below with this
Court WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER and the District Court
Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall be
filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1:
1. Transcript of the Hearing on Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Join Indispensable Parties held on April 29, 2009, a copy of which was attached to this
Motion to Augment. (Court Reporter Laura L. Whiting)
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record in this appeal shall include the
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion to Augment:
1. Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, file
stamped January 28, 2009;
2. Brief in Support of Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join
Indispensable Parties, file stamped February 18, 2009;
3. City of Caldwell's Response to Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Join Indispensable Parties, file stamped February 25, 2009;
4. Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, file
stamped March 2, 2009;
5. Amended Second Affidavit of Matthew J. McGee, file stamped April 29, 2009; and
6. Order Regarding Pioneer Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join, file
stamped May 22, 2009.
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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the briefing schedule in the above entitled appeal shall be
SUSPENDED until such time as the transcript listed above has been prepared and lodged with this
Court, at which time
DATED this

cc:

th~date

.:;;;r..::::

for the filing of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF shall be reset.

day ofJanuary 2011.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter Laura L. Whiting
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Andrew J. Waldera, ISB No. 6608
Dylan B. Lawrence, ISB No. 7136
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
18946.0059

CANYON COUNTY Cl.ERK
D. BU1U:H. DEPUTY

RECEIVED
JAN 30 2009
MOFFATT, THOMAs, BARRErr
ROCK&FIElDS.CHJD .'

Attorneys for Plaintiff / Counterdefendant
Pioneer Irrigation District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Case No. CV 08-556-C
Plaintiff,
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

vs,
CITY OF CALDWELL,

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendant.

CITY OF CALDWELL,
Counterclaiman t,
vs.
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Counterdefendant.

PIONEER'S MOTION TO DISMISS .FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES-l

Client:ll06019.1

FIL E

Pioneer Irrigation District, through its counsel of record, hereby moves this Court
for an order dismissing the Counterclaim of the City of Caldwell for failure to join indispensable
parties.
This motion is brought under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E), 12(b)(7)
and 19(a) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211.

In accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E), Pioneer wilI file and
serve its brief in support of this motion no later than 14 days prior to the hearing date.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

~ay of January, 2009.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By~~~~~~~~~~____

Scott L. Campbell - Of t Finn
Attorneys for Pioneer Irrigation District
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FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2IDay of January, 2009, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Mark Hilty
HAMILTON MICHAELSON & HILTY LLP

1301 12th Avenue
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065
Fax: 467-3058

J. Fredrick Mack
Erik F. Stidham
HOLLAND & HART LLP

101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
.
Boise,ID 83701-2527
Fax: 343-8869

(;rU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

(/)"U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Scott L. Campbell

PIONEER'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
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Scott L. Campbell, ISB No. 2251
Tara Martens, ISB No. 5773
Andrew 1. Waldera, ISB No. 6608
Dylan B. Lawrence, ISB No. 7136
Matthew J. McGee, ISB No. 7979
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K CANNON, DEPUTY

&

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
18946.0059
Attorneys for Plaintiff / Counterdefendant
Pioneer Irrigation District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Case No. CV 08-556-C
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CALDWELL,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT 0:1' PIONEER
IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

Defendant.

CITY OF CALDWELL,
Counterclaimant,
VS.

PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Counterdcfendant.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PIONEER IRIUGATION DISTRICT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES - 1

Client' 113082.4

COMES NOW Pioneer Irrigation District ("Pioneer"), by and through
undersigned counsel of record and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) and
7(b)(3) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211, and hereby submits this Brief in Support of Pioneer
Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join £ndispensable Parties. In short,
Paragraph 65(a)-(d) of the City's Answer to Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Demand for
Jury Trial of July 9,2008 (the "Answer & Counterclaim"), as well as Paragraph 2(a)-(d) of the
Prayer for Relief in that Answer & Counterclaim, request broad declarations regarding the City's
authority to construct storm water outfalls for the drainage of urban storm water. If granted, the
relief requested by the City would impact the real property interests of servient landowners to
Pioneer's irrigation easements and rights-of-way. Because those third party landowners are not
parties to this action, the City'S Counterclaim should be dismissed.
1.

BACKGROUND
On January 12,2009, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211. In its supporting brief,
the City notes that "[t]he law requires that a plaintiff join all persons whose property or legal
rights are to be decided by a lawsuit." (City of Caldwell's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Join, p. 2.) The City also asserts that "Idaho Code § 10- 1211 prohibits
claims for declaratory relief which prejudice rights of persons who are not party to the lawsuit."
(Jd.) The City argues that Pioneer has failed to join indispensible parties because the City does

not own all of the outfalls in Pioneer's facilities and, therefore, that the property interests of third
parties will be directly affected if such outfaIIs are removed. (!d. at p. 6.)
If the City's line of reasoning is correct, then the Court must also act on similar
deficiencies in the City'S CountereJaim. The City has acknowledged that third party landowners

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S
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have protected property interests in the irrigation easements and

rights~of~way

that make up

Pioneer's irrigation delivery and drainage system. Simply put, those landowners and their
property rights will be directly impacted if the relief requested in the City's Counterclaim is
granted.
The City'S Counterclaim expressly requests relief that would provide it with
sweeping police power authority to «regulate storm water and to make any improvement or
perform any labor (or to secure third parties to make improvements or perform Jabor) on any

stream or waterway to prevent the flooding of the city and secure its drainage." (Answer &
Counterclaim at" 44,45, and 65 (emphasis added).) The City further asserts that any storm
water control standards adopted by it "are enforceable against the public, private entities, and
even other governmental entities ... [including] Pioneer." (ld. at 1 48.) Ultimately, the City
concludes that it is entitled to a declaratory ruling that its Municipal Stormwater Management
Manual (the "Manual"), and the urban storm water discharges into Pioneer facilities that it
mandates, arc "squarely within [City's] general police power" and are "binding upon Pioneer."
(ld. at m! 49, 50, and 65.)
The City'S requested declaratory relief implicates the well-settled real property
rights of any and all third party owners ofland underlying Pioneer facilities. More specifically,
the City has so broadly articulated its requests for relief, that granting those requests would
necessarily increase the burden upon the real property intcrests of the landowners whose
property is servient to Pioneer's irrigation easements and rights-of-way. Because of this impact,
these third party landowners must be parties to this proceeding. They are not. Consequently,
City's Counterclaim is defective for its failure to join these indispensable third parties, and
should therefore be dismissed on that basis.
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II.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

Idaho Rules And Statutes Require The Joinder Of Parties Who Could Be
Impacted By Legal Proceedings
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(7), a claim may be dismissed for

"failure to join an indispensable party." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7). In addition, Idaho's
Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[ w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no
declaration shall prejudice the right of persons not parties to the proceeding." IDAHO CODE

§ 10-1211 (2008) (emphasis added). The failure to join an indispensible party under Idaho Code
Section 10-1211 is an affirmative defense under Rule l2(b )(7) and, once it is raised, "the burden
falls on the plaintiffs to join all indispensible parties." See, e.g., Hartman v. United Heritage

Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 197-98 (2005) (citing Tomchak v. Walker, 108 Idaho 446, 449
(1985».
Perhaps the most helpful discussion of the interplay between Rule 12(b)(7)
motions and Section 10-1211 appears in Tomchak. That ease dealt with a declaratory judgment
action, the purpose of which was to address whether a particular road had become a public road.

Tomchak, 108 Idaho at 447-48. While the Idaho Supreme Court ultimately reversed and
remanded that case to the trial court on other grounds, in doing so the court stated that, "[i]t is
true that all property owners of record to the road should be joined as indispensable parties." Jd.
at 449. See also Barren v. Dubas, 441 A.2d 1315, 1316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("[TJhere can be
no question that the fee simple owner of [a] servient tenement is an indispensable party. The
right to the use and enjoyment of [the servient] property will be adversely affected by any
litigation involving the casement and, therefore, he must be joined.").

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S
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Rule 19(a)(1) governing joinder provides further guidance about the
indispensability of parties. It provides in pertinent part:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest.
IDAIlO R. elV. P. 19(a)(l) (emphasis added).

The purpose of joinder under Rule 19 is "to protect the absentee from prejudice
resulting from the judgment, to protect the parties from harassment by successive suits and to
advance judicial economy by avoiding mUltiple litigation." See Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon

Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 292 (Id. App. 1984). "The district court should liberally
grant joinder [under Rule 19] because the absence of an indispensable party is considered a

significant defect." Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
"Whether or not a party is indispensable to an action depends largely on the relief
sought." Idaho Seh. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 132 Idaho 559, 568 (1999) (quoting

Barlow v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,896 (1974». And, a detcnnination about whether a
party is indispensible is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Utter v.

Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 366 (2002). Accordingly, a reviewing court will exanline: "(1) whether
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicablc
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1990).
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B.

Relief Granted To The City Upon Its Counterclaim Would Materially
Impact Third Parties
The City's Counterclaim provides, in pertinent part:
65.
Caldwell is entitled pursuant to Idaho Code Chapter 12,
Title 10 to have the Court render a judicial detennination that:
a.

Upon the authority cited above, the Manual is a legitimate
exercise of Caldwell's legal authority and its tenns and
provisions are binding upon Pioneer.

b.

Caldwell has the authority to regu1ate stonn water and to
make any improvement or perfonn any labor (or to secure
third parties to make improvements or perfonn labor) on
any stream or waterway to prevent the flooding of the city
and secure its drainage.

c.

In exercise of the authority described in the preceding
paragraph 65(b), Caldwell may make any improvement or
perfonn any labor (or secure third parties to make
improvements or perfonn labor) on Pioneer's claimed
facilities provided that such improvement or labor does not
materially or unreasonably interfere with the use and
enjoyment of Pioneer's easement or right-of-way by [sic].

d.

Under Idaho Code § 42-1209, Pioneer must pennit future
"encroachments" within Pioneer's claimed facilities unless
Pioneer shows that such "encroachments" materially or
unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
easement or right-of-way.

(Answer & Counterclaim, p. 16, ~ 65 (emphasis added); see also id., p. 19, ~ 2.)
The City clearly acknowledges that its declaratory judgment action will "address[]
the relative rights of Pioneer, Caldwell, and citizens within each entities' boundaries." (See
Answer & Counterclaim, p. 17, '167) (emphasis added). Not only docs the City expressly
acknowledge that the nature of Pioneer's real property interests in its irrigation facilities are
largely in the fonn of easements and rights-of-way, it also asserts that other property owners hold
fee title to some of the property underlying Pioneer's easements and rights-of-way. (See Answer
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S
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& Counterclaim, pp. 8-9,11 33.) Of course, an casement is the "right to use the land of another

for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner."
See, e.g., Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57 (2008). And, for the purposes oflimiting or

describing the type of estate held or conveyed by a party, "right-of-way" essentially has the same
meaning as "easement" in Idaho. See C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 767 (2001).
Easements and rights-of-way inherently involve two parties: the party who holds
title to the servient land in fee simple, and the party who has the right to use such land for a
purpose that is not inconsistent with the use of the property by the owner. To the extent the City
seeks a declaration of its rights to work in, modify, and discharge into Pioneer's facilities, it
necessarily seeks a declaration that will impact the third parties who hold fee simple title to the
servient land underlying Pioneer's facilities.
More specifically, as Pioneer will explain, these third party landowners are
indispensible because the relief sought by the City (1) impermissibly increases the burden on the
servient landowners associated with Pioneer's easements and rights-of-way, and (2) constitutes a
taking of the affected landowners' property for a public purpose without just compensation.
1.

The City's Counterclaim Increases The Burden Upon Servient
Landowners

Pioneer owns easements and rights-of-way in hundreds of miles of canal, lateral
ditch, and drain facilities pursuant to both federal and state law. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE

§ 42-1102; 43 U.S.C. § 661. As previously discussed, such easements and rights-of-way
necessarily pass through property owned in fee simple by servient landowners. In its
Counterclaim, the City has so broadly requested a declaration of its rights with respect to
Pioneer's irrigation facilities that such relief, if granted, would greatly impact those affected
servient landowners.
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"[A]n easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is
not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dis!.

No. 13 J, 119 Idaho 544, 548 (1991). As a general rule, "the right of an easement holder may not
be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the easement." Walker v.

Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455 (2004) (citing Abbott, 119 Idaho at 548). Furthermore, the use to
which an easement or right-of-way is devoted, or for which it is created, determines the character
and scope of the easement or right-of-way. See, e.g., Abbott, 119 Idaho at 548; Coulsen v.

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619 (1929). In Couisen, the court stated that:
The lise to which a right of way is devoted or for which it is
created determines the character of title with which the holder is
invested. The character of the use or the necessity of complete
dominion determines the extent to which he is entitled to
possession. No greater title or right to possession passes under a
general grant than reasonably necessary to enable the grantee to
adequately and conveniently make the intended use of his way.
47 Idaho at 626 (emphasis added).
Consequently, the burden borne by a servient landowner is the scope of the
easement or right-of-way for the purposes and usesfor which it was originally created. Abbott,
119 Idaho at 548 (citing Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46 (Ct. App. 1985)). With respect to the
burdens imposed upon servient landowners created by irrigation facilities in particular, the law in
Idaho is well-settled that no greater burden can be placed on the servient estate than is reasonably
necessary for the exercise of the irrigation delivery and/or drainage right. Coulsen, 47 Idaho at

628; see also Linford v. G.H. Hall & Son, 78 Idaho 49, 55 (1956) ( "As the right to the ditch or
other artificial watercourse is an easement, no change can be made against the landowner over
whose land the ditch passes that is bllrdensome to the servient tenement, or that changes the

character of the servitude . ... ") (emphasis added).
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MOTION TO DISMISS FOR F AlLURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES - 8

Client: 1 1 13082.4

In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, for example, dominant landowners had to
demonstrate the elements of a prescriptive easement in order to drain irrigation waste water over
the land of another because the manner in which the waste water flowed was altered by
collection in a ditch. Id. at 53·54. The quantity was also increased because some of the water
would have remained on a dominant landowner's parcel absent collection. [d. at 54. The court
stated:
An owner oflower property must accept the burden of surface
water which naturally drains upon his land. This burden is called a
natural servitude. However, a domina11t landowner may 1I0t
ill crease the burden upon servient lands by accumulating surface
waters with man-made structures and dischargillg those
accumulated waters, through all artificial channel, Ollto the
lower lands. To attain that right, he must establish an easement,
by prescription or agreement, to discharge the altered flow.
Merrill, 109 Idaho at 54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Notably, although the court found that a prescriptive easement existed and upheld
the findings of the district court as to the quantity of discharge allowed, the party seeking the
easement by prescription in that case appropriately brought the lawsuit against the servient
lalldowner, not the owner or operator of the community ditch in which the water accumulated.
See id. This provides further support for the conclusion that the City must either join all of the
underlying servient landowners to Pioneer's facilities or have its Counterclaim dismissed.
Again, Pioneer's facilities were created pursuant to statutes that specifically create
rights-of-way for irrigation and agricultural purposes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-1102; 43
U.S.C. § 661. As such, the nature of the flows through those facilities have always been
agricultural in nature. See Wilder Irr. Dist. v. Jorgensen, 64 Idaho 538, 550 (1943) (quoting
Nampa & Meridian frr. Dis!. v. Petrie, 28 Idaho 227, 238 (1915) (irrigation districts "facilitate
the economical and permanent reclamation of our arid lands"). More specifically, the original,
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historic burden borne by any and all servient landowners impacted by Pioneer facilities has been
the quantity, flow, and volume of: (1) irrigation water turned into the system; (2) surface
irrigation return flow water; and (3) subsurface irrigation seepage and ground water base flows.
Regarding storm water drainage in particular, the original burden imposed by Pioneer facilities
encompassed the quantity, flow, and volume of occasional stonn water sheet flows of varying
frequency and intensity depending upon any particular storm event/rom adjacent and

previously ulldeveloped lallds. l
The City's broad request for declaratory relief in its Counterclaim, if granted,
would impermissibly increase and change the scope of the original burdens imposed upon those
landowners servient to Pioneer irrigation easements and rights-of-way. City's urban storm
water discharges, and the Manual that governs them, impose a wholly new and additional burden
upon those landowners who are servient to Pioneer facilities. That new and additional burden is
I Notably, the City'S Municipal Stormwatcr Management Manual provides a useful
description of the comparative hydrological burdens on drainage systems associated with both
developed and undeveloped lands. It states:

As rain falls on an undeveloped watershed, some precipitation may
be intercepted by trees, grass, or other vegetation. Precipitation
that reaches the ground starts to fill depressions (depression
storage) and infiltrates into the ground to replenish soil moisture
and groundwater reservoirs. Ifrainfall is intense andlor of long
duration, the storage and absorptive capacity ofthe soil is
exceeded and surface runoff occurs.
As land is developed, the surfaces arc graded and covered with
non-porous materials. The reduced interception and depression
storage causes the amount and rate of runoff from developed area
to be greater than from undeveloped area. During rainfall events,
the runoff may move more quickly through the drainage system
due to unnatural routing of the flows and increased flow rates.
Minor or major flooding may result.
(Exhibit A to Answer & Counterclaim, p. 7.)
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the forced acceptance of municipal storm water flows, gathered, collected, and channeled from
developed, adjacent and non-adjacent impervious surfaces, and the water quantity and water
quality concerns that accompany such flows.
This new municipal storm water burden impermissibly and wholly "changes the
character of the [original/underlying] servitude," because servient landowners are no longer
merely dealing with the historic types and quantities of flows in Pioneer's facilities (the
occasional flow of storm water sheet flows received from adjacent and undeveloped lands and
the burdens of irrigation water deliveries and return flow). See Linford, 78 Idaho at 55.
Pioneer's facilities were neither created nor designed to serve as a municipal storm sewer
system, nor has Pioneer owned, operated, or maintained its facilities to serve such a purpose. See

Bissett v. Pioneer Irr. Dist.) 21 Idaho 98, 105 (1912) ("The object and purpose to be
accomplished [by an irrigation district] is the irrigation oflands."). Consequently, servient
landowners with property underlying Pioneer facilities have never before been burdened by this
type of use of Pioneer's facilities. Therefore, the City must join those servient landowners as
indispcnsable parties because its requested relief would directly infringe upon the well-settled
real property rights of those servient third party landowners.

2.

The City's Counterclaim Constitutes A Taking Of The Servient
Landowners' Property

In addition to imposing further burdens on properties servient to Pioneer's
facilities in violation of the law governing easements and rights of way, the City'S Counterclaim
also constitutes a taking ofthose servient properties without due process oflaw or just
compensation. See IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 14. "Private property may be taken for public use,
but not until ajust compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shaH be paid
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therefor." Jd. Thus, the City cannot be accorded the relief it seeks unless it joins servient
landowners, and its Counterclaim should be dismissed on that additional basis.
Pioneer does not dispute that the City has general eminent domain authority under
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code; however, such authority may not be exercised by simply
requesting a broad judicial declaration without compliance with the relevant eminent domain
statutes. This is particularly the case to the extent the City is seeking a judicial declaration
confirming the validity of any existing storm water discharges.
The Idaho Legislature has set forth a detailed, mandatory framework for a
municipality's taking of private property for public use. See IDAIIO CODE §§ 7-701 et seq. The
prevention of flooding and securing of drainage expressly qualify as public uses under those
statutes. See IDAHO CODE § 7-701. Because the City's requested declaration seeks to use private
property for public use, it must, as a constitutional matter, make a complaint for condemnation
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 7-701 et seq. The complaint must contain "[tJhe names of all

owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a statement that they are unknown, who
must be styled defendants." IDAHO CODE § 7-707(2). See also Moore v. Howell, III Idaho 963,
965 (Ct. App. 1986) (lienholders were interested and indispensible parties under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 19(a)(l) in eminent domain proceedings, but their interests were not impaired
because they were wholly subsumed by the senior lien holder, who was a party).
A particularly relevant example is Rich v. Wylie, 84 Idaho 58 (1962). In that case,
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court's refusal to set aside a default
judgment in eminent domain proceedings, where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of an
affected party's interest in the property and failed to join the party. !d. at 63. According to the
court, it was a violation of due process to bind a person with a known interest in the land at issue
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to a condemnation judgment without giving that person an opportunity to have his cause tried
and detennined as in other condemnation proceedings. !d. at 62-63.
In this case, the City has knowledge of the servient landowners encumbered by
Pioneer's irrigation facilities. These parties certainly have an interest in the dominant facilities
which the City seeks to appropriate for a public use. Therefore, the City must join those parties
and comply with the eminent domain procedures and requirements of Title 7, Chapter 7 of the
Idaho Code, or else its Counterclaim must be dismissed. Otherwise, granting the City's
requested reliefwill violate the due process rights of servient landowners and constitutc an
impennissible taking of their real property.

III.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Paragraph 65(a)-(d) of the City's Counterclaim requests this Court to
make broad declarations regarding the City's unfettered authority to drain stonn water into
Pioneer's irrigation facilities. Ifgranted, such reliefwould increase and change the scope of the
irrigation casements and rights-of-way for the undcrlying landowners, because the nature of the
flows and drainage in those facilities would dramatically change. Similarly, the City is seeking a
declaration confinning its authority to use these private property interests for the public use of
urban drainage. Under these circumstances, Paragraph 65(a)-(d) of the City's Counterclaim and
the relief requested in Paragraph 2(a)-(d) of the City'S Prayer for Relief should be dismissed for
failure to join indispensable parties.
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DATED this 18th day of February, 2009.
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By~~~~~~=*~~

_____

Scott L. Campbell - Of
Attorneys for Pioneer Irrigation District
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CALDWELL,
Defendant.

Case No. CV 08-556-C

CITY OF CALDWELL'S
RESPONSE TO PIONEER
IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

CITY OF CALDWELL,
Counterclaimant,
-VS.-

PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Counterdefendant.
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COMES NOW, the above-named defendantlcounterclaimant, City of Caldwell
("Caldwell"), by and through its counsel of record, HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY,
LLP and HOLLAND & HART, LLP, and hereby files this Response to Pioneer lrrigation
District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties ("PID's Motion to
Dismiss").

I.

INTRODUCTION

Pioneer Irrigation District ("PID") seeks dismissal of Paragraphs (a) through (d) of
Caldwell's counterclaim for declaratory relief based on Rule 19 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rule 19") and Idaho Code § 10-1211. PID's motion fails for several independent
reasons and should be denied. In essence, PID's motion to dismiss is a "me too" motion, seeking
to co-opt the reasoning underlying Caldwell's recent motion to dismiss. However, PID's motion
should be denied because there exists fundamental differences in the type of relief requested by
PID in its First Amended Complaint - namely, removal of outfalls that are owned and/or relied
on by parties other than Caldwell - and the relief requested by Caldwell in its counterclaim.
Caldwell's counterclaim seeks a declaration of rights vis-a.-vis Pioneer. Caldwel1 seeks a ruling
that Caldwell's Storm Water Management Manual ("Manual") is valid, enforceable, and binding
upon PID.

Caldwell also seeks a declaratory judgment regarding its statutory authority to

regulate storm water drainage and a ruling that Caldwell may encroach on the canals, ditches,
and drains used by PID for irrigation, so long as the encroachment does not constitute an
unreasonable or material interference. Lastly, Caldwell seeks a ruling that PID must allow future
encroachments by Caldwell, so long as the encroachments do not constitute an unreasonable or
material interference.
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Each of the categories of relief requested by Caldwell can be determined between the
parties currently involved in this litigation without joining any third parties. The Court need not,
for example, join any third parties to detennine the validity of the Manual and its enforceability
on PID. Likewise, the Court can readily determine whether Caldwell has the right to encroach
on the ditches, canals, and drains used by PID, so long as the encroaclnnent does not constitute
an unreasonable or material interference. The requested relief does not prejudice third parties'
rights and will not subject PID to the risk of inconsistent judgments. Therefore the hypothetical
third parties identified by PID are not necessary parties-much less indispensible pursuant to
Rule 19(a)(2).
Lastly, even if joinder were appropriate, the Court should decline to join any additional
parties based on the applicability of the public interest exception to Caldwell's claim for
declaratory relief.

The important legal issues raised by Caldwell's counterclaim would be

impossible to adjudicate if every potential person who was interested in the Manual and/or
Caldwell's policies for handling storm water had to be joined.

II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS l

PID argues that Caldwell's counterclaim requires joinder of all persons who own land
underlying the hundreds of miles of ditches, canals, and drains that PID uses to transport
irrigation water. The following subparagraphs of Caldwell's counterclaim are at-issue in PID's
motion:
a. The Manual is a legitimate exercise of Caldwell's legal
authority and its terms and provisions are binding upon Pioneer.

I

For a more detailed statement of facts, see Caldwell's Counterclaim at pages 10 through 18.
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b. Caldwell has the authority to regulate stonn water drainage and
to make any improvement or perfonn any labor (or to secure third
parties to make improvements or perfonn labor) on any stream or
waterway to prevent the flooding of the city and secure its
drainage.
c. Caldwell may make any improvement or perfonn any labor (or
to secure third parties to make improvements or perfonn labor) on
Pioneer's claimed facilities provided that such improvement or
labor does not materially or unreasonably interfere with the use
and enjoyment of the easement .or right-of-way by Pioneer.
d. Under Idaho Code § 42-1209, Pioneer must pennit future
"encroachments" within Pioneer's claimed facilities unless Pioneer
shows that such "encroachments" materially or unreasonably
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-ofway.
In contrast, as discussed in connection with Caldwell's Motion to Dismiss, PID's

Amended Complaint requested an order requiring Caldwell to remove any "unauthorized" or
"unlawful" outfalls - regardless who owned or used the outfal1s for drainage. See e.g., PID's
Amended Complaint at page 13 ("For an order requiring Defendant to ensure that any
unauthorized points of discharge owned or constructed in Pioneer facilities by Defendant or
pursuant to the Manual or that are owned by Defendant are timely removed and repaired at no
expense to Pioneer."). For that reason, Caldwell insisted - correctly - that PID must identify all
third parties whose rights would be affected by removal of the outfalls. The Court agreed and
required PID to identify out falls and the identity of parties who must be joined on or before
March 12, 2009.
PID argues that dismissal of Caldwell's counterclaim is appropriate because some
unidentified and absent third parties might have ownership interests in the land underneath the
network of canals, drains, and ditches that PID uses to transport irrigation water. PID does not,
however, in its Motion to Dismiss introduce any facts about the number of such parties, whether
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Ca1dwell has actually applied the Manual to them, or otherwise taken their interests or deprived
them of due process.

PID also does not introduce any evidence showing that Caldwell's

implementation of the Manual or Caldwell's handling of storm water discharge has increased the
burden on the servient estate of any hypothetical third party that PID argues must be joined.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

PID Has Not Established the Existence of Necessary or Indispensable Parties.
Rule 19 provides, in relevant part, that:
A person who is subject to serVice of process shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among the parties . .. (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situateq that
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
that interest or (iiJ leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligdtions by reason of the claimed interest.

Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a) (emphasis added).

This is what is known as the "necessary party"

analysis. The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that ')oinder of all parties with an interest in the
subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of
the suit should bejoirted." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714,152 P.3d 581,
585 (Idaho 2007).

Only if the Court determines that an absent third party is "necessary" under Rule 19(a)(I)
does the Court tum to an analysis whether the absent third party is indispensible. Idaho R. Civ.
P.19(a)(2). According to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(2), "[iJf a [necessary party] ...
cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
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being thus regarded as indispensable." Id. The rule states that the Court should consider the
following factors in making the decision whether a party is indispensable:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a) (emphasis added). "The moving party has the burden to demonstrate the
indispensability of a party." Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145
Idaho 360, _ , 179 P.3d 323,335 (Idaho 2008).
PID's motion must be denied under this rubric. First, PID has not demonstrated that the
absent third-parties referenced in PID's motion are necessary, much less indispensable. The
merits of Caldwell's ·counterclaim can be adjudicated by the Court without reference to the rights
of any absent third party-·much less the hypothetical landowners "identified" in PID's motion.
Second, PID has not shown that any ruling here would impede an absent third party's ability to
protect its interests or leave PID exposed to the risk of inconsistent judgments. Furthermore, the
hypothetical absent third parties are not indispensable to this action. PID has made no showingmuch less a satisfactory showing - that a judgment rendered in absence of these hypothetical
third parties would be prejudicial to PID. PID has also not explained why the Court could not
protect against any potential prejudice by tailoring its ruling to the parties presently before the
Court. PID fails to offer any reasons why a judgment rendered in the absence of the hypothetical
third parties would be inadequate as it relates to Caldwell and PID. Finally, Caldwell would not
have an appropriate remedy if the Court dismisses its counterclaim for nonjoinder.
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1.

PID Has Not Satisfied Its Burden for Joinder.

PID bears the burden of establishing the necessity and indispensability of a third party.
See Total Success Investments, LLC, 179 P.3d at 335. PID's motion is devoid of discussion

regarding the above-quoted

factor~

relevant toRule 19(a)(1). PID does not, for example discuss

why complete relief cannot be accorded between PID and Caldwell or why proceeding without
these hypothetical third parties would result in a risk of PID incurring inconsistent obligations.
Instead, PID makes sweeping (and unsupported) arguments about the nature of the hypothetical
servient landowners' interests in their property and why they might be entitled to compensation
for a taking or why their due process rights might be violated. But PID provides no evidence
that Caldwell has actually applied the Manual in a way that affects the interests of any of the
hypothetical third parties. Instead, the record is silent and PID simply argues that all landowners
underlying the hundreds of miles o{ditches, canals, and drains must be joined.
The Court can only consider whether a party is indispensible (and therefore whether
dismissal is appropriate) if a party has prevailed on its burden of establishing the Rule 19(a)(1)
factors. Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). PID has entirely failed to address these factors in its moving
papers. Therefore PID has not carried its burden and its motion to dismiss must be denied on
that basis alone. Total Success Investments, LLC, 179 P.3d at 335.
This is very different from the situation that Caldwell faced when it filed its own motion
to dismiss for failure to join. There, Caldwell was faced with a claim for declaratory relief that
sought the removal of certain outfalls. PID had not, however, identified the outfalls. Therefore
it was clear to Caldwell that third parties' rights were at stake and that Caldwell could soon find
itself in the position of facing inconsistent obligations regarding those outfaIIs. Additionally,
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complete relief could not be accorded between Caldwell and PID over those outfalls because
they were likely owned, maintained, and/or relied on by third parties. Therefore Caldwell could
not introduce evidence of the specific outfalls in connection with its motion to dismiss - it
simply had no basis from which to guess which outfalls PID thought were unlawful.
In contrast, PID is in control of all information from which it can detenmne and therefore
provide evidence regarding whether a particular third party should be joined. It can evaluate the
real property records for parcels underlying its alleged easements and rights-of-way and evaluate
whether any potential party has rights that are not adequately being represented. Moreover, it
can evaluate which outfalls it contends are unduly burdening any servient estates.
PID's motion is void of any information of this type. Instead, PID focuses on vague (and
as shown below, irrelevant) concepts of property law and case law regarding principles of
eminent domain and due process. What PID has altogether failed to do is introduce evidence
that would allow the Court to determine that complete relief cannot be accorded between PID
and Caldwell over subparagraphs (a) through (d) of Caldwell's counterclaim. PID also was
obligated to introduce evidence that it ran the risk of prejudice if the parties were not added. PID
failed to satisfy this requirement and as a result its motion must be denied.
2.

Complete Relief Regarding Caldwell's Counterclaim Can Be Accorded Between
the Parties.

Even if PID had made some attempt to address the Rule 19 factors, PID's motion still
should be denied. There is no reason that the Court cannot enter complete relief on the merits of
Caldwell's counterclaim based on the parties that are currently before it. Caldwell is not seeking
a ruling that a nonparty does or does not have rights in PlD's facilities, or that Caldwell has
rights of ingress or egress over any third party's land.

Instead, Caldwell's counterclaim is
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focused exclusively on its rights to regulate and control stonn water, whether PID can refuse to
consent to an encroachment that does not materially or unreasonably interfere, and about the
enforceability of the Manual and its binding nature on PID. There is nothing about these claims
that would require the Court to make any fmdings regarding the rights and/or responsibilities of
absent third parties.
In Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (Idaho
2007), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the owner of a parcel of real property was not a
necessary party in an action to enforce the right to use an easement. The court reached this result
despite the fact that Tower Asset Sub, Inc. was only a lessee of property and not the record
owner.

In short, complete relief could be accorded between the parties before the court.

Likewise, in Total Success Investments, LLC, the Court held that the plaintiff Total Success
Investments failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that Boise City, Idaho Power, the
United States, and a bank that had landscaped a portion of the disputed area were indispensible
third parties. See Total Success Investments, LLC, 179 P.3d at 335. Notably, the Court held that
a determination that Ada County Highway District had acquired a roadway over a disputed
parcel of real estate could be rendered without joining other parties who also encroached on the
disputed area. [d. Once again, complete relief could be accorded without joining any third
parties.
In this case, complete relief can be accorded between PID and Caldwell over Caldwell's
counterclaim. PID has challenged the validity of the Manual. Caldwell is entitled to a ruling
that the Manual is enforceable as against PID.

Likewise, PID has challenged Caldwell's

statutory authority to manage stonn water. Caldwell is entitled to a ruling making clear to PID
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that Caldwell has the police power and statutory authority to regulate storm water drainage and
to prevent flooding.

Additionally, PID has challenged Caldwell's authority to make

improvements or perform labor related to the exercise of its police power and statutory authority.
Finally, there is a justiciable controversy between the parties over whether PID must pennit
future encroachments, provided those encroachments do not materially or unreasonably interfere
with PID's easements or rights-of-way.
Viewed in this framework, PID's objections regarding joinder of hypothetical landowners
who may have an interest in the Manual or Caldwell's handling of stonn water are unsupported.
Indeed, every citizen of Caldwell may have "an interest" in how storm water is treated within
Caldwell's city limits and area of impact or an opinion about the Manual. But that does not
mean that they should be joined.

In a moment of candor, PID admits that nonparties need not be joined to detennine
questions regarding enforceability of the Manualandlor regarding PID's rights under Idaho law.
See PID's Opposition Brief at 12 ("In the present case, other third party urban storm water
constructors and owners are not necessary parties to determine the validity of City's
manual or to offer a declaration of Pioneer's tights under Idaho Code and common law.")
(emphasis added).

Only after the Court granted in part Caldwell's motion to dismiss and

required PID to identifY which outfalls it wants removed and, accordingly, who must be joined
did PID abandon its prior position and argue that joinder of third paIiies is required. PID's flipflop does not diminish the fact that only one month ago, PID argued that joinder of third parties
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was not required to decide almost exactly the same Issues that are raised by Caldwell's
counterclaim. 2
3.

PID is Not at Risk of Inconsistent Judgments.

PID also has not introduced any eviderrce that it is at risk of incurring inconsistent
judgments if the Court denies its motion. Even ifPID had made some effort to offer evidence or
even discuss this factor, PID's motion still must be denied because PID runs no risk of
inconsistent judgments if Caldwell's requested declaratory relief is granted. Caldwell's claim for
declaratory relief is focused entirely on the enforceability of the Manual on PID, Caldwell's
statutory authority to regulate storm water (authority disputed by PID), and whether PID must
pennit encroachments by Caldwell so long as the encroachments do not materially or
unreasonably interfere.
There is no foreseeable risk of PID suffering inconsistent judgments in this case.
Caldwell is entitled to a ruling that the Manual is a valid exercise of its police and statutory
power given that a real and justiciable controversy exists between the parties about the
enforceability of the Manual.

Compare PID's Complaint requesting a declaratory judgment

"that the Manual conflicts with state law and is void[]" with Caldwell's Counterclaim requesting
a declaratory judgment that "[tJhe Manual is a legitimate exercise of Caldwell's legal authority
and its terms and provisions are binding upon Pioneer." Such a ruling will settle the dispute once
and for all between the parties to this action. And it will not expose PID to the risk of
inconsistent judgments. Therefore joinder of these hypothetical nonparties is inappropriate.

2 As discussed above, the aspects ofPID's complaint that were at issue in Caldwell's motion to
dismiss are very different from the relief that is targeted by PID in its Motion to Dismiss.
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4.

PID Has Not Demonstrated that the Hypothetical Third Parties Are Indispensable.

PID asserts that an unknown number of hypothetical land owners are indispensable
parties. Yet PID does not explain why those hypothetical parties are indispensable under Rule
19(a)(2). As discussed above, the Court must consider the following factors in reaching that
decision:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2) (emphasis added).
PID has introduced no evidence or authority regarding the first factor. There would be no
prejUdice to PID or Caldwell if the Court proceeds to judgment on the merits of Caldwell's
counterclaim. In fact, the opposite is true. The unknown number of hypothetical servient estate
owners have no documented interest in this Court's ruling regarding the enforceability of the
Manual beyond the interest shared equally with all citizens of Caldwell.
Even though Caldwell perceives no need to do so, if the Court has lingering concerns
about the impact of its judgment on nonparties, the Court could expressly limit the scope of its
ruling to the parties before it. That way there could be no concern about the impact of the
Court's ruling on nonparties before the Court.
A judgment rendered in the absence of the hypothetical nonparty servient landowners
would be adequate because the issues raised by Caldwell's counterclaim - enforceability of the
Manual, Caldwell's rights under Idaho law, and PID's authority to refuse consent to an
encroachment - concern the two parties to this action and not the potential third parties discussed
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in PID's motion. Therefore any ruling regarding Caldwell's counterclaim would adequately
resolve the dispute between the parties.
Finally, Caldwell lacks an adequate remedy if the Court dismisses Caldwell's
counterclaim for nonjoinder of the hypothetical third parties. See Nat'l Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 676 F.Supp. 271, 276 (D.D.C. 1985) (observing that "dismissal for failure to join would

deny plaintiff an adequate forum in which ever to prosecute its claim."). As discussed above,
PID has challenged the legitimacy of the Manual. PID has also challenged Caldwell's statutory
authority to regulate storm water drainage and prevent flooding within the city limits and area of
impact. Caldwell would be left without a remedy (or a meaningful defense) if it could not seek a
declaration in its favor that it is empowered to take steps to protect its citizens from the
uncontrolled discharge of storm water within its boundaries. Accepting PID's argument would
require joining potentially every citizen of Caldwell (given that all citizens arguably have an
interest in how storm water is controlled). This would obviously be impracticable. Requiring
joinder of the hypothetical third parties discussed in PID's motion would effectively deprive
Caldwell of a forum within which to obtain relief from PID's challenges to Caldwell's municipal
authority.
B.

PID is Not Entitled to ReJief Under Idaho Code § 10-1211.
In relevant part, Idaho Code § 10-1211 provides as follows:

When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding.
Idaho Code § 10-1211 (emphasis added).
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Idaho Code § 10-1211 does not provide a viable basis to dismiss Caldwell's counterclaim
because the absent third parties referenced in PID's motion have no interests that would be
affected by Caldwell's requested relief. Second, Caldwell's requested declaratory relief would
not prejudice the rights of any absent third parties.
1.

Absent Servient Landowners' Interests Are Not Affected by Caldwell's Claim.

The hypothetical landowners described by PID in its motion to dismiss do not have
interests that would be affected by Caldwell's chtim for declaratory relief. As discussed above,
PID has challenged the enactment and implemeritation of the Manual. Caldwell is entitled to a
declaration that the Manual is an- enforceable exercise of Caldwell's police power. That ruling
would not have any tangible affect on the rights of any nonparty, however, because Caldwell is
not seeking to apply the manual on any non party or seeking a ruling regarding Caldwell's rights
in any nonparty's property. Therefore PID has not identified any particular interests that would
be affected if Caldwell's claim proceeds to judgment.
PID cites Tomchak v. Walker, 108 Idaho 446, 700 P.2d 68 (Idaho 1985), for the
proposition that "[i]t is true that all property owners of record to the road should be joined as
indispensable parties." PID's Brief at 4 (citing Tomchak, 108 Idaho at 447-48). However,

Tomchak is not controlling because it involved a request by the plaintiffs for a declaratory
judgment that a portion of property owned by the absent third party was a county highway.
Therefore it was logical that the Idaho Supreme Court would note in passing that the nonparty
landowner should have been joined. The situation is different in this case because Caldwell is
not seeking a ruling about its rights in an absent third party's property. Instead, Caldwell is
seeking a ruling regarding its authority to enact the Manual, Caldwell's rights to regulate storm
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water, and PID's right to withhold consent to an encroachment that does not materially or
unreasonably interfere with its alleged easement or right-of-way. Therefore third party rights are
not affected by the relief requested by Caldwell in its counterclaim.
Courts do not require joinder of every potential person who might be "interested" in a
statute. Helgeland v. Wise. Municipalities, 745 N.W.2d 1, 32 (Wis. 2008). "If the statute 'were
so construed, the valuable remedy of declaratory judgment would be rendered impractical and
indeed often worthless for determining the validity of legislative enactments, either state or local,
since such enactments commonly affect the interests of large numbers of people.'" Id. at 32-33
(citations omitted). In Helgeland, tbe plaintiff sought an interpretation of her rights under certain
state statutes and the constitution. For that reason, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
district court did not err by refusing to permit the municipalities to intervene and appropriately
denied the request under Wisconsin's uniform declaratory judgment act. Id.
Even if the hypothetical third party landowners did have interests that are potentially
affected by the pendency of this action, PID adequately represents that interest here.

See

Helgeland, 745 N.W.2d at n.1 09. To the extent that PID argues that the hypothetical absent third

parties have an interest in a ruling that the Manual is unenforceable, PID will advance that
position in this litigation. Likewise, to the extent PID argues that the hypothetical landowners
would object to storm water being discharged into a ditch or canal running across their property,
PID will represent that interest. Therefore the hypothetical third party interests, such as they are,
do not merit joinder pursuant to Rule 19(a) or Idaho Code § 10-1211.
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2.

Third Party Rights Are Not Prejudiced by Caldwell's Claim.

Likewise, servient landowners are not prejudiced by Caldwell's requested declaratory
relief. Caldwell is not seeking application of the Manual on any absent third-party's interests or
property. Instead, as discussed above, Caldwell's counterclaim for declaratory relief is focused
on the enforceability of the Manual and its binding nature on PID. Caldwell also seeks a ruling
regarding its police power and statutory authority to regulate storm water and control flooding.
Lastly Caldwell seeks a declaration about whether PID must accept encroachments, so long as
those encroachments do not materially or unreasonably interfere with PID's alleged easement or
right-of-way.

Therefore the declaratory relief sought by Caldwell in this action will not

prejudice the rights of any absentthird party and Idaho Code § 10-1211 provides no basis for
PID to argue that these hypothetical third parties should be joined.
C.

Even if the Court Holds that Non Party Rights Are Affected, Joinder is Not
Appropriate Under the Public Interest Exception to Rule 19.

Even if the hypothetical third party landoWners "identified" by PID have some potential
interest at issue, the Court should nevertheless deny PID's motion based on the public interest
exception to Rule 19. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing
public interest exception); Burford, 676 F.2d at 276. The public interest exception finds its
origin in Nat '/ Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362-67 (1940). In that case, the United
States Supreme Court held that nonparty employees need not be joined even though the litigation
potentially affected on their interests under the National Labor Relations Act.

The Court

reasoned that
[a]s the National Labor Relations Act contemplates no more than
the protection of the public rights which it creates and defines, and
as the Board's order is directed solely to the employer and is
ineffective to detennine any private rights of the employees and
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leaves them free to assert such legal rights as they may have
acquired under their contracts, in any appropriate tribunal, we
think they are not indispensable parties for purposes of the Board's
order and the statute does not require their presence as parties to
the present proceeding and there was no abuse of the Board's
discretion in its failure to make them parties.

Id. at 366.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the applicability of the public interest exception in Conner

v. Buiford, 848 F.2d 1441,

1459~60

(9th Cir. 1988) ("Subsequent courts have also refused to

require the joinder of all parties affected by public rights litigation-even when those affected
parties have property interests at stake-because of the tight constraints traditional joinder rules
would place on litigation against the goveruinent."). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that
owners of mineral and gas leases did not ne,ed to be joined in a case seeking to "enforce the
public right to administrative compliance with the environmental protection standards of NEPA
and the ESA." 1d. The lessees argued that joinder was required because the district court's
ruling destroyed their valuable private property rights. The appellate court disagreed, reasoning
that the district court's order did not adjudicate the lessee's mineral and gas claims and that "the
lessees remain free to assert whatever Claims tbey may have against the government." 1d. at
1461.
Therefore, even if the Court finds that the hypothetical servient estate owners have a
potential interest in the subject matter of this litigation, the Court should nevertheless deny Pill's
motion on the basis of the public interest exception to Rule 19. The sheer number of potential
parties who would potentially have an interest in the management of storm water coupled with
the essentially public nature of Caldwell's counterclaim make this case appropriate for resolution
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without joinder of any additional parties and/or dismissal due to the indispensability of any
potential third party.

D.

PID's Cited Authority Regarding Property Rights, Eminent Domain, and Due
Process are Inapposite.
PID argues at length that Caldwell's requested declaratory relief "implicates the well-

settled property rights of any and all third party owners of land underlying Pioneer facilities."
Brief at 3. PID also argues that allowing Caldwell to proceed with its requested declaratory
relief would deprive these landowners of due pro:cess and constitute an unlawful taking and that
therefore these hypothetical non-parties must be joined. There is no factual or legal support for
this position.
All persons within Caldwell, including those of the hypothetical third parties discussed in
PID's motion to dismiss, take their property subject to Caldwell's police power. See The Idaho
Constitution at Art. XII, § 2 ("Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws."); Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 151, 742 P.2d 397, 406
(Idaho 1986) (holding that only if government exceeded police power-something that has not
happened here-----could a takings claim proceed and that such an analysis would require a caseby-case, fact-specific determination as to whether the particular facts rose to the level of a
"taking" under the Idaho and/or federal Constitutions); State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 487-488,
600 P.2d 787, 791 - 792 (Idaho 1979) (recognizing, in a case involving regulation of liquor that
the "exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance,
or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without
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due process oflaw") (internal citation omitted); State ex reI. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791,800801,554 P.2d 969, 978 - 979 (Idaho 1976) ("In the present case, if the purposes of the Act are
within the police power of the legislature and the means adopted are constitutional then there is
no taking of property requiring compensation;");, see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53,
7 Cush. 53, 84 (1851) ("We think it a well settled principle ... that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.").
Taken to the extreme, if PID's argument were to be accepted at face value, Caldwell would be
required to initiate litigation against every property owner within its city limits each and every
time it validly attempted to exercise its constitutionally granted police powers. It is beyond
dispute that such action is not required.
Therefore, even if Caldwell prevails and the Court rules that the Manual is enforceable
and that Caldwell has police powers and statutory authority to regulate storm water and control
flooding, there would be no potential for a takings claim and/or due process challenge by any
party - much less the hypothetical third parties identified by PID in its motion to dismiss and the
authority. Indeed, the only result of that decision would be a confirmation that Caldwell is acting
pursuant to its police power - and thereby not engaging in a compensable taking and/or due
process violation. For that reason, the cases cited by PID regarding general principles of eminent
domain and due process are inapposite.
PID's arguments regarding eminent domain and due process fail for an additional reason.
Any potential due process challenge and/or takings claim that the hypothetical landowners could
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potentially raise based on the Manual andlor Caldwell's handling of storm water is not ripe. See,
City of Coeur D'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845, 136 P.3d 310, 316 (Idaho 2006). In
Simpson, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "[t]hough neither party has argued the issue,
ripeness is a prerequisite to justiciability and we cannot ignore it."

The court ultimately

concluded that the facts presented by the case,were ripe for decision. Id. Nevertheless, Simpson
makes clear that ripeness is a necessary precondition of any potential claim by the nonparties
"identified" in Pill's motion. See also Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 221, 596 P.2d 75, 93
(Idaho 1978) ("Whether or not a governmental agency has exceeded its police power and taken
private property for public use is a question of law for the determination of the court under the
existing facts and circumstances of the particular case. Not until the trial court determines that
private property has been taken for public use is the question of the amount of damages ripe for
the determination of a jury.").
Pill has offered no evidence that Caldwell has applied the Manual tb the hypothetical
third parties or attempted to deprive these third parties of any property rights that would
constitute an unlawful taking andlor deprive, them of due process rights. The Court would be
unable to proceed with a takings or due process claim unless and until the City seeks a specific
implementation of the Manual and the partiCUlar facts of an alleged taking or due process
violation were brought before the Court. Only if the Court determined that Caldwell exceeded
its police power and had taken private property for a public use could the Court proceed to an
analysis of whether the taking was compensable, See Simpson, 142 Idaho at 845; Rueth, 100
Idaho at 221. Therefore Pill has not presented even the potential for any ripe or concrete injury
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that the Court can consider when determining whether the hypothetical nonparty landowners
have an interest that requires joinder.
Likewise, PID has failed to introduce any evidence of a justiciable controversy between
Caldwell and any of these third party servient land owners. As discussed above, Caldwell is not
seeking any ruling from the Court regarding application of the Manual and/or Caldwell's police
power to the alleged rights of any hypothetical third party. Caldwell is not seeking a ruling that
the Manual is enforceable on any third party. As a result, there is no justiciable controversy
between Caldwell and these hypothetical third parties. This provides an additional reason why
PID's motion to dismiss for failure to join mu~t b~ denied.
PID cites a number of cases regarding the rights of easement holders as compared with
owners of the servient tenement. However, Caldwell is not seeking any declaration of its rights
as compared with the rights of the hypothetical landowners described in PID's motion.
Therefore those cases are inapplicable. For example, PID relies on Abbott v. Nampa School

District No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1208 (1991) for the proposition that "an
easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with
the general use of the property by the owner." PID's Brief at 8.

However, in Abbott, the

Supreme Court affirmed an award in favor of a third party who obtained a license agreement
from an irrigation district for purposes of relocating a culvert and placing a safety screen on the
plaintiff servient estate owner's property.

The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the

competing interests and rights involved in the matter and ultimately concluded that the evidence
supported the trial court's finding that the use of the easement did not constitute an enlargement
of the irrigation district's easement.
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Abbott does not provide a basis for join:der here because Caldwell is not seeking a ruling

that it has rights to install an outfall in any particular non-party's servient estate. As noted
above, a hypothetical land owner in the Abbotts' situation could still bring an inverse
condemnation action or otherwise raise a challenge if it felt that the City's application of the
Manual resulted in an unlawful taking.

Ther~fore

the cited authority regarding the rights of a

servient estate owner is inapposite at this stage given that Caldwell is not requesting an opinion
on whether Caldwell has rights in the properties' of those third parties or seeking to apply the
Manual to any potential third party.
Similarly, Coulson v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619 (1929) does not
require joinder of the hypothetical third party owners of servient estates. PID has introduced no
evidence that the Manual andlor Caldwell's st9rm water polices actually increase the burden on
any servient estate. Caldwell does not dispute ,that owners of servient estates may have property

.

rights that, if taken for public use, may require payment of just compensation in certain
circumstances. As noted above, those unidentified and still hypothetical property rights can be
addressed (if appropriate) at a later time in a proper procedural forum. However, this lawsuit is
not an appropriate forum given that Caldwell's requested relief is tailored to PID and does not
implicate the rights of non-party servient estate owners. And as noted above, to the extent that
the Court has any residual concerns about the rights of nonparties, the Court can tailor its relief
accordingly. Therefore the hypothetical third parties are not indispensibJe to adjUdication of the
instant action between Caldwell and PID.
PID asserts that Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46 (Ct. App. 1985) supports PID's
argument that joinder is required. Merrill is inapposite because the plaintiffs in that case were
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seeking a ruling that they had rights to divert surface water onto the land of the defendant
property owners. Unlike the situation in Merrill, Caldwell merely seeks a declaration regarding
the Manual and whether PID is bound thereby, Caldwell's authority to regulate storm water
drainage, and PID's authority to prohibit an encroachment so long as the encroachment does not
materially or unreasonably interfere. Again,

Cal~well

is not seeking a declaration of its rights to

encroach on the private property of any nonp~ or a declaration of its rights in relation to that
non-party. Caldwell's requested relief focuses on PID and therefore Merrill is of no persuasive
value.
PID argues, but offers no evidentiary support for that argument, that the Manual and/or
Caldwell's management of storm water expands the nature and/or use of the servitude that PID
uses to transport irrigation water. Brief at 11 .. PID has no basis to argue that the requested relief
would unduly burden the nonparty landowners and that joinder is required. Once again PID
presents an argument that is not ripe and/or justiciable. There is no basis for PID to assert that
every land owner underlying the network of canals, drains, and ditches relied on by PID for
irrigation has a claim against Caldwell for expansion of that servitude. Therefore the case law
cited by PID regarding expansion of an underlyirig easement simply does not apply.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, PID's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

PID has not

demonstrated the existence of any necessary indispensible parties that would require dismissal
under Rule 19(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Second, Caldwell's claim for

declaratory relief does not affect or prejUdice the rights of absent third-party landowners.
Therefore PID has failed to satisfy its burden of proving the existence of an indispensible party
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and the motion to dismiss must be denied. Finally, PID's cited authority regarding principles of
due process and eminent domain are irrelevant because any potential claim by a third party
landowner is not ripe and/or justiciable. PID's motion should be denied and Caldwell should be
allowed to proceed with its claims for declaratory relief.
DATED thisZ~ day of February, 2009.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

BY~~~~~+-

____-L~~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____

Scott E. Rand 1 h, for the firm
Attorneys for Defendant City of Caldwell
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Pioneer Irrigation District, through its undersigned counsel of record, hereby files
this Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties. It is
supported by the Affidavit of Matthew J. McGee (the "McGee Affidavit"), filed
contemporaneously herewith.

I.
THE CITY IMPROPERLY FOCUSES UPON RULE 19 AT THE EXPENSE OF RULE
12(b)(7) AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 10-1211
In its response brief, the City discusses Rule 19 extensively, going so far as to
argue that the lack of discussion of the factors in Rule I 9(a)(2) in Pioneer's brief constitutes
some sort of fundamental defect in Pioneer's motion and briefing. (City's Resp., pp. 5-13,
16-18.) Simply put, this argument is not supported by Idaho law or the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
What the City fails to recognize is that Pioneer's motion is a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(7) and Section 10-1211. It is not a motion for joinder under Rule 19. While
Rule 19 may be helpful for the purposes of analyzing a Rule 12(b)(7) motion, it is not a legally
binding part of a Rule 12(b)(7) motion under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.' In fact,
Pioneer was unable to locate any reported Idaho Supreme Court cases adopting Rule 19 as part
of the analysis of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7).
Particularly confusing in this regard is the City's discussion of the factors in
Rule 19(a)(2). (City's Resp., pp. 5-6.) Even if Rule 19 were specifically applicable, an analysis
of the factors in Rule 19(a)(2) is only necessary when "a person as described in [Rule 19(a)(1)]
cannot be made a party," i.e., when that person is not "subject to service of process" as provided
, While the federal version of Rule 12(b)(7) contains an express reference to Rule 19,
Idaho's Rule 12 (b)(7) does not.
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in Rule 19(a)(l), and the Court must therefore "determine whether in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties before it." By definition, the non-party landowners
who are servient to Pioneer's facilities are subject to service of process. IDAHO CODE

§ 5-514(c). Therefore, there is no need to proceed to the Rule 19(a)(2) analysis.
Simply put, there is no basis for the City's extreme reliance upon Rule 19, or for
its argument that Pioneer's motion is fundamentally flawed due to a lack ofRu1e 19 analysis. 2
However, as the next section of this reply brief will explain, the standards of Rule 19 do support
Pioneer's motion.
II.
RULE 19 SUPPORTS PIONEER'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE
CITY'S COUNTERCLAIM ON NON-PARTY SERVIENT LANDOWNERS

Even if Rule 19 were legally binding, it still supports Pioneer's motion. Again,
Rule 19(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a
party in the action if (l) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest.
LR.C.P. 19(a)(l) (emphasis added).
Pioneer has already explained in its original brief in support of its motion why the
servient landowners are necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(I). (Pioneer's Br. in Supp.,

2

It is also noteworthy that the factors in Rule 19(a)(2) are for the Court to consider.

There is no specific procedural requirement in that rule that the factors be discussed in a Rule
12(b)(7) motion or a Rule 19 motion.
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pp. 4-11.) Simply put, the City's requested relief of discharging municipal storm water into
Pioneer facilities at-will inherently implicates the real property interests of the servient
landowners to the Pioneer facilities that would be carrying this municipal storm water.
"[IJmpair[ing] or imped[ing]" the interests of a non-party is one of the specifically enumerated
grounds for joinder in Rule 19(a)(I).
Another ground for joinderunder Rule 19(a)(1) is when there is a "substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations."3 I.R.C.P. 19(a)(1). Ifthe
relief requested in the City's Counterclaim is ultimately granted, Pioneer would then have little
ability to object to the continued expanded discharge of municipal storm water into its facilities.
As Pioneer notes in its complaint, Pioneer has a statutory duty to ensure that its facilities do not
contain more water than they can "easily contain" and to ensure that water from its facilities does
not "damage or in anyway injure the property or premises of others." IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1203,
42-1204; (see also Pioneer's Amended Complaint, p. 7.)

When flooding occurs from Pioneer facilities due to municipal storm water
discharges, it is foreseeable that affected landowners will seek redress from Pioneer under these
statutes. This "Catch-22" of being forced by the City to accept increasing volumes of municipal
storm water discharge into Pioneer's facilities, while simultaneously being liable for flooding
from these facilities, imposes clear "inconsistent obligations" upon Pioneer. To avoid these
inconsistent obligations, either the City's Counterclaim must be dismissed, or the non-party
servient landowners should be joined to this proceeding.

3 The City incorrectly describes this standard as whether Pioneer runs the risk of
inconsistent "judgments." (City's Resp., p. 11.)
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And, as Pioneer has already explained, Rule 19(a)(2) is totally irrelevant to its
motion because all of the servient landowners are "subject to service of process" pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 5-514(c).4 In summary, application of Rule 19 supports Pioneer's motion.

III.
IDAHO CODE SECTION 10-1211 EXPLICITLY STATES THAT A DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF NON-PARTIES
All of the City's discussion of Rule 19 deflects attention from the legal provision
that is most applicable and relevant to Pioneer's motion: Idaho Code Section 10-1211. Again,
that statute, which is part ofIdaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, provides in pertinent part:
When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding.
IDAHO CODE § 10-1211 (emphasis added).
This language is broad and unequivocal. And, the Idaho Supreme Court has
specifically applied Section 10-1211 in conjunction with a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(7). See Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co; 141 Idaho 193 (2005); see also
Tomchak v. Walker, 108 Idaho 446 (1985).
The City cannot refute this statute. Instead, it expands and mischaracterizes
Pioneer's position, in the hopes that its "slippery slope" arguments will scare the Court into
denying Pioneer's motion. For example, according to the City, "[a]ccepting PID's argument

4 And, notably, one of the factors to be considered in Rule 19(a)(2) is "to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already
parties." Pioneer has already discussed the prejudice to the non-party servient landowners
extensively in its original brief. Therefore, the City's assertion that "PID has introduced no
evidence or authority regarding the first factor [of rule 19(a)(2)]" is totally inaccurate. (City's
Resp., p. J 2.)
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would require joining potentially every citizen of Caldwell (given that all citizens arguably have
an interest in how storm water is controlled}." (City's Resp., p. 13.)
This is not what Pioneer argues. Pioneer's arguments do not relate to "every
citizen of Caldwell." Instead, as Pioneer repeatedly explains in its original brief, Pioneer is
concerned about the "the real property interests of servient landowners to Pioneer's irrigation
easements and rights-of-way." (Pioneer's Br. in Supp., p. 2; see also Pioneer's Br. in Supp.,
pp. 3,6-7,8,9-10, 11, B.)
In this regard, the City cites as persuasive authority the case of Tower Asset Sub

Inc. v. Lawrence, which states, "[tJhis Court has held that joinder of all parties with an interest in
the subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object
of the suit should be joined." 143 Idaho 710, 714 (2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
This is precisely the point. For the purposes of this analysis, the "object[s)" of the City's
Counterclaim are Pioneer's facilities. Pioneer is not arguing that any citizen within the City with
a general interest in storm water runoff is an indispensable party. Instead, it is arguing that nonparties with a real property interest in the "object[s]" of the suit are indispensable parties.
The City even goes so far as to claim that, "[t]aken to the extreme, ifPID's
argument were to be accepted at face value, Caldwell would be required to initiate litigation
against every property owner within its city limits each and every time it validly attempted to
exercise its constitutionally granted police powers." (City's Resp., p. 19.) Pioneer agrees with
the characterization ofthe City's statement as "extreme," but does not agree that it is based upon
accepting Pioneer's argument at "face value." As has been amply explained, Pioneer's
arguments relate to the owners of real property servient to Pioneer facilities, and those property
owners only.
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IV.

THE CITY GLOSSES OVER THE EXTENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN ITS
COUNTERCLAIM
In its response brief, the City attempts to ameliorate the expansive relief sought in
its Counterclaim, by characterizing it as "focused on the enforceability of the Manual and its
binding nature on PID." (City's Resp., p. 16.)5 Despite the City's characterization, Pioneer
submits that the relief sought is much more expansive and, ultimately, more detrimental to both
Pioneer's interests and the interests of the servient landowners than the City admits. Again, the
City's Counterclaim provides, in pertinent part:
65. Caldwell is entitled pursuant to Idaho Code Chapter 12, Title
10 to have the Court render a judicial determination that:
a. Upon the authority cited above, the Manual is a legitimate
exercise of Caldwell's legal authority and its terms and provisions
are binding upon Pioneer.
b. Caldwell has the authority to regulate storm water and to make
any improvement or perform any labor (or to secure third parties to
make improvements or perform labor) on any stream or waterway
to prevent the flooding of the city and secure its drainage.
c. In exercise of the authority described in the preceding paragraph
65(b), Caldwell may make any improvement or perform any labor
(or secure third parties to make improvements or perform labor) on
Pioneer's claimed facilities provided that such improvement or
labor does not materially or unreasonably interfere with the use
and enjoyment of Pioneer's easement or right-of-way by.
d. Under Idaho Code § 42-1209, Pioneer must permit future
"encroachments" within Pioneer's claimed facilities unless Pioneer
shows that such "encroachments" materially or unreasonably
5 The City also states that because "PID has challenged the validity of the Manual,"
"Caldwell is entitled to a ruling that the Manual is enforceable as against PID." (City's Resp.,
p.9.) This is another attempt to deflect attention from the real focus of Pioneer's motion, which
is the City'S Counterclaim. Dismissing a portion of the City's Counterclaim does not hinder its
ability to defend against Pioneer's requested relief. TQ the extent the City wishes to defend
against Pioneer's challenge of the Manual, the procedurally appropriate place to do that is in its
Answer, not its Counterclaim. Pioneer's motion relates to the City's Counterclaim only.
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interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-ofway.
(City's Answer & Counterclaim, p. 16, , 65(a)-(d).)
When taken together, these portions of the City's Counterclaim request an
expansive judicial declaration that would provide the City with the authority to install outfalls in
Pioneer facilities for the purpose of municipal storm water discharge, with no basis for Pioneer
or the underlying servient landowners to object.
In Paragraph 65(a), the City requests judicial confirmation that "the Manual is a
legitimate exercise of Caldwell's legal authority and its terms and provisions are binding upon
Pioneer." In its Amended Complaint, Pioneer explains why the Manual is objectionable.
(Pioneer's Amended Complaint, pp. 4-6.) In short, Pioneer believes the Manual does not comply
with Idaho law because it allows the City and developers to install storm water outfalls in
Pioneer facilities merely by providing "notice" to Pioneer; and because it allows such new
outfalls to discharge municipal storm water in quantities that exceed historical irrigation related
discharge rates. Pioneer believes this does not comply with Idaho Code Sections 42-1102 and
42-1209 and the body ofIdaho case law defining the scope of prescriptive easements and
historical drainage rights.
In Paragraph 65(b), the City essentially seeks judicial confirmation that it may
engage in any activity in "any stream or waterway" (which the City presumably interprets to
include any Pioneer facility) if the purpose of that activity is to "secure its drainage." This is an
extremely broad request for relief that, if granted, would wholly prevent the ability of Pioneer, or
any servient landowner to Pioneer facilities, to object to the outfalls and resulting increased
municipal drainage water.
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In Paragraph 65(c), the City essentially seeks judicial confirmation that it may
engage in any activity in Pioneer facilities, so long as the "improvement or labor" does not
materially or unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of Pioneer's easement or rightof-way. This language tracks Sections 42-1102 and 42-1209, at the expense of the rights of the
underlying servient landowners.
While Pioneer agrees that Sections 42-1102 and 42-1209 are fully binding upon a
party seeking to make any alterations to Pioneer facilities, these statutes do not constitute the
exclusive universe of applicable law. Where, as here, the "improvement or labor" will increase
the burden upon the underlying servient landower, then that non-party's rights are at issue as
well, in addition to Pioneer's rights. As drafted, Paragraph 65(c) seeks ajudicial confirmation
that would ignore the servient landowner's interests.
The wording of Paragraph 65(d) helps to illustrate this overall point. While 65(d)
is worded specifically in terms of Pioneer's rights; Paragraphs 65(a), (b), and (c) are not. And,
taken together, these requests for relief seek judicial confirmation of the City's ability to drain
municipal storm water into Pioneer facilities, with very little ability to object by Pioneer or the
underlying non-party servient landowners.6

V.
THE SERVIENT LANDOWNERS ARE NOT "HYPOTHETICAL"
The City repeatedly-and disingenuously--characterizes the servient landowners
at issue as "hypotheticaL" (See, e.g., City's Resp., pp. 3,6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,
2 I, 22.) To be clear, these landowners are most certainly not "hypothetical." Pioneer has
already explained this issue in detail in its original brief. (Pioneer's Br. in Supp., pp. 7-10.)
6 And, Paragraph 65(d) would also require Pioneer to acquiesce to the City's installation
of outfalls in Pioneer facilities, even over a valid objection by a servient landowner.
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Rather than making legal arguments in response, the City simply refers to the landowners as
"hypothetical. "
To summarize Pioneer's previous explanation on this issue, the nature of
Pioneer's property interests in the majority of its facilities are in the form of rights-of-way
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, common law, or federal statute. In other words,
Pioneer does not own those facilities in fee simple. Fundamentally under real property law,

someone else owns fee simple title to the servient real property. The City has admitted as much
in its answer to Pioneer's complaint:
Caldwell and other affected property owners hold fee title to the
property underlying some or all of Pioneer's facilities and those
owners are entitled to the use and enjoyment of their property,
including its use for drainage, based upon protected property
rights.
(City's Answer & Counterclaim, pp. 8-9,133.)
Far from being "hypothetical," such servient landowners are real and identifiable.
In this regard, the City's labeling of such landowners as "hypothetical" appears to imply that
Pioneer was required to identify such landowners by name in its motion and supporting brief. If
this is what the City argues or implies, there is no legal support for that proposition. Neither
Rule 12(b)(7), nor Rule 19, nor Section 10-1211 contains such a requirement as to Pioneer's
motion. To the contrary, Rule 19(a)(3) requires the "pleading" to identify indispensable parties
under Rule 19(a)(1 )-(2). Here, the relevant "pleading" is the City's Answer and Counterclaim.
See I.R.C.P. 7(a).

Pioneer has identified the category oflandowners at issue. Given the extensive
nature of Pioneer's facilities, this is reasonable and legally sufficient. To the extent there is any
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requirement to actually identify the landowners at issue, that is the responsibility of the Citynot Pioneer.

VI.
THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE
The "public rights" or "public interest" exception to joinder ofindispensible
parties advanced by the City is inapplicable for a variety of reasons. (See City's Resp.,
pp. 16-18.) First, that doctrine has been adopted by the federal courts as an exception to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19-the City cites no cases adopting it as an exception to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 19, much less as an exception to Idaho Code Section 10-1211, which requires
that "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration." IDAHO CODE § 10-I 211.
Second, the City's counterclaim is not "narrowly restricted to the protection and
enforcement ofpublic rights." National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309
U.S. 350, 363 (1940) (emphasis added). To fall within the "public rights" or "public interest"
exception to Federal Rule 19, "the litigation must transcend the private interests of the litigants
and seek to vindicate a public right." Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1996).
While the City characterizes the relief it requests as a declaration of the manual's validity, the
City also repeatedly suggests that it seeks relief only as against Pioneer. Although the City
purports to represent the public interest in drainage in this litigation, the language of its
Counterclaim suggests a private dispute with Pioneer about Pioneer's refusal to allow the
installation of municipal storm water discharge outfalls. That the City is a municipality
ostensibly seeking to confirm its police power does not automatically transform its broad request
for relief against Pioneer (and the owners of servient land underlying Pioneer facilities) into the
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transcendent vindication of a public right. A municipality is not immune from compliance with
the rules of joinder simply because it is a municipality.
Third, application of the exception must not "destroy the legal entitlements of the
absent parties." Id. As noted in Pioneer's initial briefing on this issue, the servient landowners
have a legal entitlement to the maintenance of the dominant estate as it was originally created.
(Pioneer's Br. in Supp., pp. 7-11.) The nature and scope of their respective burdens may not be
enlarged absent prescription or agreement.
Finally, the City's suggestion that the circumstances of this case allow for the
application ofthe public rights exception twists the purpose and rationale ofthe exception itself.
The exception seeks to avoid dismissal of cases where a number of persons cannot be served in a
single federal district. See National Resource Defense Council v. Berklund, 458 F.Supp. 925,
933 (D. D.C. 1978) (public rights exception applied where applicants for preference right coal
leases residing in a multitude of states could not "feasibly be joined in anyone district"). More
generally, "[t]he 'public rights' exception serves to remove joinder as an obstacle that might
otherwise preclude litigation against the government." National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,
676 F.Supp. 271, 276 (D. D.C. 1985) (citing Berklund, 458 F.Supp. 925). In other words, this
exception arose to prevent the federal government from using joinder as a way to avoid litigating
an issue simply because the litigation would affect the rights of non-parties in multiple federal
districts.
The federal district and appellate court cases cited by the City in its discussion of
the public rights exception generally involve environmental public interest groups suing federal
agencies regarding the agencies' implementation of federal environn1entallaws. Ultimately, the
courts applied the exception in those cases largely because service of process to appropriately

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES-12

Client:1147205.2

join all necessary and indispensible parties would have been impossible, thus destroying the
environmental group's ability to ever address the substance of the litigation. See Burford, 676
F.Supp. at 276 (lands involved were in seventeen different states); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608
F.Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (hundreds ofputative defendants were "outside the reach
of[the] court's summons"). The City only superficially addresses this point by noting the large
number of potential parties in this case. However, many, if not all, of the non-party landowners
who are servient to Pioneer's facilities were discernable and, as discussed supra, all were subject
to service of process upon the City's filing of its Counterclaim. And, the reason there are so
many indispensable party landowners is because the City is seeking judicial confirmation of its
ability to install storm water outfalls in any and all Pioneer facilities.
In essence, in order to rationalize its failure to identify and join interested servient
landowners, the City is attempting to utilize an exception to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
which evolved to protect a party's ability to find a forum to challenge acts of the federal
government. Because there is no "public rights" exception to joinder in Idaho, and equally
important, because the circumstances of this case do not suggest vindication of a public right
without prejudice to the legal entitlements of non-parties, the "public rights" exception does not
apply.
VII.
THE NON-PARTY CONCERNS ARE "RIPE"

In Idaho, ripeness requires that "(1) the case presents definite and concrete issues;
(2) a real and substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a
present need for adjudication." United Investors Life Ins. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 633 (2007)
(quoting State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342 (2005».
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The City states that Pioneer "has offered no evidence that Caldwell has applied
the Manual to the hypothetical third parties or attempted to deprive these third parties of any
property rights." (City's Resp., p. 20.) The City suggests that third party claims are not ripe
"until the City seeks a specific implementation of the Manual." (Jd.) However, the City has
made the claims ripe by seeking a declaration of its authority to take action under the Manual
prospectively as against not only Pioneer, but also necessarily as against servient landowners.
The City asserts that it is not requesting relief as against third parties or seeking to
take the property of third parties for a public purpose. That the City does not expressly refer to
third party landowners in its request for relief does not alter the fact that by its plain tenns, the
City seeks a declaration that it may improve any stream or waterway, including Pioneer facilities.
As judicially admitted by the City, Pioneer's facilities generally consist of dominant estates in
land and, as a legal matter, are intertwined with the property rights of servient landowners. 7 A
judicial declaration that the City may alter Pioneer facilities is meaningless if the rights of the
servient landowners are not also adjudicated. Put simply, the evidence Pioneer has produced is
the dominant-servient relationship that Pioneer facilities have with the underlying property and
the law prohibiting enlargement of servient tenements absent agreement or prescription. In
conjunction with the City's Counterclaim for relief, that evidence is sufficient to demonstrate
concrete issues, the existence of a real controversy, and the present need for adjudication as to
the servient landowners.
Finally, even assuming the City did not ripen the issues as they pertain to servient
landowners, by its broad request for declaratory relief, there is no question that the City has

7 The City's Answer expressly affinns that essential point. See, City's Answer and
Counterclaim, pp. 8-9,133.
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specifically implemented the Manual. By its own admission, municipal stonn water outfalls
have been installed in Pioneer facilities, pursuant to the Manual. See McGee Af£, Ex. A. The
discharge of municipal stonn water into Pioneer facilities presents definite and concrete issues
for landowners servient to Pioneer facilities and does not depend on hypothetical facts.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2009.
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By~~~~~~~~~~~__

Scott L. Campbell - Of the
Attorneys for Pioneer Irrigation District
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of March. 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES to be served by the method indicated below. and addressed to
the following:
Mark Hilty
HAMILTON MICHAELSON & HILTY

LLP

1301 12th Avenue
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, 10 83653-0065
Fax: 467-3058

J. Fredrick Mack
Erik F. Stidham
& HART LLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527
Fax: 343-8869
HOLLAND

( ) U,S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile

90

( ) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(I() Facsimile
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Scott L. Campbell, ISB No. 2251
Bradley J Williams, ISB No.4019
Tara Martens, ISB No. 5773
Dylan B. Lawrence, ISB No. 7136
Matthew J. McGee, ISB No. 7979
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

J;

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 8~701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
18946.0059
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Attorneys for Plaintiff / Counterdefendant
Pioneer Irrigation District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Case No. CV 08-556-C
Plaintiff,
AMENDED SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
MATTHEW J. MCGEE

vs.
CITY OF CALDWELL,
Defendant.

CITY OF CALDWELL,
Counterclaim ant,
vs.
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Counterdefendant.

AMENDED SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW J. MCGEE-1

Ciient115026 7.1

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
MATTHEW J. MCGEE, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I am

one of the attorneys representing Pioneer Irrigation District in the above-referenced matter. I
have access to the client's files in this matter, and make this affidavit based upon personal
knowledge, and in support of Pioneer's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Join Indispensable Parties.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the

City ofCaldwell'.sAnswers, Responses, and Objections to Plaintiffs First Set ofInterrogatories,
Requests for ~dmissions, and Requests for Production of Documents. Only the cited pages from
the documenkar~attached.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Matthew J. McGee
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of April, 2009.

NOTA Y PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at -,co..:.B~(),,",,--,-(.....
S,-,f,,----==-----.----=--_ __
My Commission Expires 5'--.31 -;:201;;Z
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW J. MCGEE to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mark Hilty
HAMILTON MICHAELSON & HILTY LLP

1301 12th Avenue
P.O. Box 65
Nampa,ID 83653-0065
Fax: 467-3058

('P U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

J. Fredrick Mack

c(.) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Erik F. Stidham
HOLLAND & HART LLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 2527
Boise, ID 83701-2527
Fax: 343-8869

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Matthew J. McGee
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EXHIBIT A
TO AMENDED SECOND AFFIDA VrT OF
MA ITHEW 1. MCGEE

.J

MARK HILTY, ISB #5282
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
1303 12th Avenue Road
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, Idaho 83653-0065
(208) 467-4479 Telephone
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile

RECEIVED

APR 1 52008
MO~~TE&THOMAS. BARRETT.
VVJ\

FIELDS. CHID.

J. FREDERICK MACK, ISB #1428
ERIK F. STIDHAM, ISB # 5483
HOLLAND & HART, LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
(208) 342-5000 Telephone
(208) 343-8869 Facsimile
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

CITY OF CALDWELL,

Defendant.

Case No. CV 08-556-C-

CITY OF CALDWELL'S ANSWERS,
RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS, AND REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

CITY OF CALDWELL,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
VS.

PIONEER IRRIGATION D1STRICT,
Counterclaim Defendant.

CITY OF CALDWELL'S ANSWERS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORJES, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS,
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1

EXHIBIT A

.

ANSWER:

Caldwell objects to Request for Admission No. 32 on the basis that

Pioneer has failed to define or identifY "Pioneer Facilities." Subject to said objection, Request
for Admission No. 32 is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33.

Please admit that Defendant has constructed

Pipes or other encroachments in Pioneer's Facilities that allow for the Discharge of municipal
stonn water runoff, without the written permission of Pioneer.
ANSWER:

Caldwell objects to Request for Admission No. 33 on the basis that

Pioneer has failed to define or identify "Pioneer's Facilities". Subject to said objection, Caldwell
admits that Pioneer may claim Facilities within which exist Pipes or other encroachments that
were constructed without Pioneer's written pennission.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34.

Please admit that Developers have installed

Pipes or other points of municipal stonn water Discharge into Pioneer's Facilities, without
Pioneer's written permission, in order to satisfy development requirements, including those in
the Manual, imposed by the City of Caldwell.
ANSWER:

Caldwell objects to Request for Admission No. 34 on the basis that

Pioneer has failed to define or identify "Pioneer's Facilities." Subject to said objection, CaldweH
admits that Pioneer may claim Facilities within which exist Pipes or other points of municipal
storm water Discharge into Pioneer's Facilities, without Pioneer's written pennission, in order to
satisfy development requirements, including those in the Manual, imposed by the City of
Caldwell.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35.

Please admit that Defendant has approved of

or acquiesced in the installation of municipal storm water Discharge Pipes into Pioneer's
Facilities by Developers seeking land use approvals from Defendant.
CITY OF CALDWELL'S ANSWERS, RESPONSES, AND OBJEC'flONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS,
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS -19

ANSWER:

Admit.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36.

Please admit that Developers have dedicated

municipal storm water Discharge Pipes present in Pioneer's Facilities to the Defendant to
become part of its street and road system.
ANSWER: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37.

Please admit that Defendant has taken

ownership from Developers of one or more Pipes or other points of Discharge of storm water
runoff into Pioneer's Facilities.
ANSWER: Deny.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1:

Please produce any documents related to

Defendant's storm water management policies and procedures, including, but not limited to,
internal memoranda and internal or independent reports or studies that prompted or contributed
to the adoption of the Manua!.
RESPONSE: Caldwell objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected
by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Subject to and without waiving
said objections, to the extent responsive, non-privileged documents exist they will be produced.
Further, Caldwell advises that such information will be contained primarily in Caldwell
Engineering files concerning general drainage issues and the drafting and adoption of the
Manual.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2:

Please produce Documents which are

sufficient to identify the City of Caldwell's boundaries and Arca ofbnpact.

CITY OF CALDWELL'S ANSWERS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS TO
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Mark Hilty, ISB #5282

MAY 2 2 2009

Aaron Seable, ISB #7191
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON &HILTY,LLP
1303 12th Avenue Road
P.O. Box. 65
Nampa, Idaho 83653-0065
Telephone: (208) 461-4479
Facsimile: (208) 467-3058

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

RECEIVED

Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483
Scott B. Randolph, ISB #6768
HOLLAND & HART UP
Suite 1400~ u.s. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83101-2527
Telephone; (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

MAY 262009
MOfFATT,THOMAS,BAARETT
ROCK&AELDS.CHTO

Attorneys for Defendant
IN TBE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

Case No. CV 08-556-C

/;!-vCPlaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CALDWELL,

[JROifosEDl ORDER
REGARDlNG PIONEER
IRlUGATION DISTRICT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN

Defendant.

CITY OF CALDWELL,

COWlterc1rum ant,
-vs-

PIONEER IRRlGATION DISTRICT,
Counterdefendant.

ORDER REGARDING PIONEER IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN- 1

.

NO. 7723

MAY. 15.2009 5:21PM

P. 2/4

This matter having come before the Court' on Plaintift7Counterdefendant Pioneer
Irrigation District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join, and being otherwise fully advised in
the premises, and finding good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby DENIES the motion.
The Court specifically incorporates by reference the proceedings held in open court on
April 29, 2009, wherein the Court described in detail the basis for it
DATED this1
_

0 day of May, 2009.
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